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Black: Principal and Agent--Notice--Fraudulent Acts of Sole Agent

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
NOTICE - FRAUDULENT AcTS OF
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT SoLE AGENT. - Prior to September 3, 1925, the directors of the
plaintiff bank extended the defendants a line of credit. Blank
notes signed by the defendants, were deposited with specific directions to the cashier only to fill in notes for amounts necessary
to cover checks drawn by defendants against the credit. On
Sept. 3, 1925 defendants paid off their indebtedness and
closed out their account demanding of the cashier the unused
blank notes. The cashier, the sole agent dealt with, told the defendants he had destroyed the notes. In January, 1928, the cashier
filled in two of these notes, naming the bank as payee, to cover
up his defalcations. The bank was denied relief in this action to
recover on the notes. State Bank of Pampin v. Payne.'
So far as third persons are concerned notice to an agent
acting within the scope of his authority is, as a rule, notice to the
principal, even though the agent has not in fact communicated
such notice2 The reason substantiating this rule is the duty of
the agent to disclose to his principal facts pertinent to his agency
coupled with the presumption that he has discharged that duty.
Cases where the agent obtained the knowledge, while engaged in
an independent fraudulent act, disclosure of which to the principal would prevent its consummation, form an exception to the
above general rule.' For in such cases there can be no presumption
that the agent has made disclosures so obviously adverse to his
interests.
The court recognized the validity of these general principles,
but adopted a modification of the exception and imputed notice
to the principal. The court said, "To this exception there is a
qualification equally important and decisive, that is, in cases in
which the agent when committing the fraud was the sole representative of the principal. When this appears, the general rule
The cases cited by
of imputed notice to his principal applies."
the court substantiate this modification of the exception to the
general rule of imputed notice.
'159 S. E. 163 (Va. 1931).
'Jaquith v. Davenport, 191 Mass. 415, 78 N. E. 93 (1906); Sheppard v.
Wood, 78 Ill. App. 428 (1898).
'Innerarity v. Merchants National Bank, 139 Mass. 332, 1 N. E. 282
(1885); Metcalf v. Draper, 98 Ill. App. 399 (1901).
'Knobley Mountain Orchard Co. v. People's Bank of Keyser, 99 W. Va.
438, 129 S. E. 474 (1925); Mays v. First State Bank, 247 S. W. 845 (Tex.
Com. App. 1923); Marietta Trust & Banking Co. v. Faw, 31 Ga. App.
507, 121 S. E. 244 (1924); Lowndes v. City National Bank, 82 Conn. 8, 72
Atl. 150 (1909); Atlantic Cotton Mills v. Indian Orchard Mills, 147 Mass.
268, 17 N. E. 496 (1888).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1931

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [1931], Art. 19
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
The decision effects a desirable result, but some difficulty is
encountered with the theory relied upon to support it. It is difficult to perceive how the mere fact that the agent was the sole
representative of his principal in contradistinction to situations in
which the principal has two or more agents acting in the transaction would make any difference, that is, it would not make such
sole agent any more likely to disclose to his principal facts coming
to his knowledge during an independent fraudulent transaction.
Where the agent is the sole representative of a corporation, the
corporation cannot claim anything except through him and, therefore, if it claims through him, after notice of the facts, it must
accept his agency with its attendant notice.' In the situation involved in this case the bank in accepting is affected with notice,
accordingly it is not a holder in due course, and hence cannot recover.'
-DONAniU F. BLAcx.
8" See 2 MEcHEm ON AGENCY p. 1412.

If it be granted that the agent here was acting outside the scope of his
authority resort might be had to a ratification theory, since he would then
be in the position of having received the item for the bank, as agent for the
bank, and the bank under such circumstances could not claim the unmixed
benefits of the transaction.
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